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THE COST OF PRIVACY: 
RILEY V. CALIFORNIA’S IMPACT ON CELL 
PHONE SEARCHES 
 
Jennifer L. Moore, Jonathan Langton, and Joseph Pochron 
DeSales University 
2755 Station Avenue, Center Valley, Pennsylvania 18034 
jennifer.moore@desales.edu 
ABSTRACT 
Riley v. California is the United States Supreme Court’s first attempt to regulate the searches 
of cell phones by law enforcement.  The 2014 unanimous decision requires a warrant for all cell 
phone searches incident to arrest absent an emergency.  This work summarizes the legal 
precedent and analyzes the limitations and practical implications of the ruling.  General 
guidelines for members of the criminal justice system at all levels consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s decision are provided.   
Keywords: search incident to arrest, cell phone searches, U.S. Supreme Court 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The law notoriously lags behind 
advancements in technology.  The initial 
explosion of cybercrimes in the 21st century 
left the American criminal justice system 
woefully unprepared.  The courts struggled to 
confront the emerging crimes of computer 
hacking, Internet viruses and sexting with 
traditional criminal statutes.  Forced to work 
within the confines of criminal laws already 
on the books, trespass, theft and child 
pornography statutes were stretched to new 
limits (Birkhold, 2013). While the federal and 
state governments eventually updated their 
laws, the technology gap remains.1  The slow 
response time of state and federal legislatures 
perpetuates a legal system constantly trying 
                                                     
1 See The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1030 (2008); Pennsylvania enacted its 
sexting statute on October 25, 2012 in 18 PA.C.S. 
§ 6312 (2014). 
to “catch up” with innovation.  In addition, a 
two hundred year old constitution is also 
asked to confront modern technological issues 
that the founding fathers never imagined.  
The long delay in the appellate process 
further exasperates the technological gap, as 
the Supreme Court just addressed the now 
outdated use of pagers in 2010 (City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 2010). 
The search and seizure clause of the 
Fourth Amendment was recently evaluated in 
relation to cell phone privacy.  Nearly 41 
years after the development of the first mobile 
phone (“The first mobile”, 2013), the Supreme 
Court in Riley v. California issued its first 
major privacy ruling regarding the devices.  In 
a unanimous decision, the justices 
emphatically ruled that the search of a 
suspect’s cell phone incident to arrest requires 
a warrant.  Conceding that Riley will now 
make the job of law enforcement more 
difficult, the Court emphasized the unique 
attributes of cell phones and the cost of 
maintaining personal privacy (Riley v. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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California, 2014).  Local, state and federal law 
enforcement agencies must now confront the 
real-world impact of Riley in criminal 
investigations.  This article will examine the 
legal aspects of the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Riley and highlight the limitations of the 
ruling.  In addition, the practical effect of the 
decision on various parties in the criminal 
justice system will be evaluated in detail.  
Finally, a blueprint of acceptable digital 
forensic techniques after Riley will be 
explained. 
2. THE SUPREME 
COURT’S UNANIMOUS 
VERDICT 
The Supreme Court consolidated the cases of 
David Leon Riley and Brima Wurie in a 
groundbreaking case regarding the evolution 
of privacy in the digital age. In separate 
incidents, both men had their cell phones 
searched incident to arrest without a warrant.  
The information contained on their cell 
phones ultimately led to convictions for 
additional offenses.  Riley was initially 
stopped in California for a traffic violation 
but eventually arrested after an inventory 
search revealed two loaded handguns under 
the hood of his car.  During the search 
incident to arrest, Riley’s cell phone was 
removed from the pocket of his pants and 
searched preliminarily by the police officer on 
scene.  A review of texts messages and 
contacts indicated membership in the Bloods 
street gang.  Two hours after the arrest, a 
detective further analyzed Riley’s cell phone 
without a warrant at the police station.  The 
detective discovered photographs of Riley 
standing near a car allegedly used in a drive 
by shooting.  Riley was ultimately convicted 
for attempted murder, assault with a 
semiautomatic firearm, and firing at an 
occupied vehicle and sentenced to 15 years to 
life in prison for his involvement in the drive 
by shooting (Riley v. California, 2014, p. 
2481).  
Brima Wurie was arrested after 
purchasing drugs and two cell phones were 
seized from his person incident to arrest.  At 
the police station, Burie’s phone continued to 
receive calls from a contact noted as “my 
house.”  An officer opened the flip phone and 
accessed the call log to retrieve the incoming 
telephone number.  A trace of the number 
was completed to obtain a physical address.  
After securing a search warrant, the police 
searched Burie’s home and seized weapons, 
cash and large amounts of crack cocaine.  
Burie’s convictions resulted in a sentence of 
262 months in federal prison (Riley v. 
California, 2014, p. 2482).   On appeal, both 
cases raised the question of whether a warrant 
is needed to search a cell phone incident to 
arrest.   
Chief Justice Robert’s opinion addressed 
the question presented within the framework 
provided by the leading search incident to 
arrest case, Chimel v. California.  In 1969, 
Chimel declared that police officers could 
perform a warrantless search of a suspect and 
the area within the suspect’s immediate 
control incident to an arrest.  This exception 
to the warrant requirement was justified by 
the potential threat to officer safety and the 
possibility for the destruction of valuable 
evidence (Chimel v. California, 1969). The 
Chimel doctrine was extended to include a 
quick search of personal property 
“immediately associated with the person of the 
arrestee” (U.S. v. Chadwick, 1977, p. 15).  In 
searching for relevant precedent applicable to 
the factual scenarios before the Court, Chief 
Justice Roberts focused on the 1973 decision 
of United States v. Robinson.  The holding in 
Robinson permitted police officers to search a 
crumpled cigarette packet located in a 
suspect’s coat pocket incident to arrest.  A 
review of the contents of the cigarette packet 
revealed illegal drugs.  The Supreme Court in 
Riley had to determine if a cell phone was 
analogous to that crumpled cigarette package 
or an entirely different category of property.   
Similar to most Fourth Amendment cases, the 
answer hinged on the balancing of government 
interests and individual privacy.   
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The unanimous decision spent a 
significant amount of time examining the 
unique characteristics of a cell phone.  When 
compared to other physical objects, the Court 
emphasized the vast quantitative and 
qualitative differences of the modern phone.  
The immense storage capacity and variety of 
data contained on cell phones was 
emphasized, which Chief Justice Roberts 
noted could just “as easily be called cameras, 
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape 
recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, 
televisions, maps or newspapers” (Riley v. 
California, 2014, p. 2489). Accordingly, a 
warrantless search of a cell phone implicates a 
substantially greater violation of privacy than 
reviewing the contents of a wallet or cigarette 
packet.  The Court noted that 90 percent of 
adults in America essentially have “on their 
person a digital record of nearly every aspect 
of their lives–from the mundane to the 
intimate” (Riley v. California, p. 2490).  A 
detailed examination of a cell phone is 
analogous to an exhaustive search of an entire 
home.2  Accordingly, cell phones were 
distinguished from other types of personal 
property and the precedent from Robinson 
was inapplicable.   
The decision also reviewed each of the 
Chimel rationale as they applied to cell 
phones–officer safety and the imminent 
destruction of evidence.  The Supreme Court 
quickly dismissed the concern for officer 
safety, noting that “[d]igital data stored on a 
cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon 
to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate 
the arrestee’s escape” (Riley v. California, 
2014, p. 2485).  While police officers remain 
free to examine the physical aspects of a cell 
phone for concealed risks, such as razor 
blades, the content of the phone remains 
protected.  The Court also clarified that the 
                                                     
2 Chief Justice Roberts explained that, “a cell 
phone search would typically expose to the 
government to far more than the most exhaustive 
search of a house” (Riley v. California, 2014, p. 
2491). 
potential for “indirect” threats from third 
parties does not justify an automatic 
warrantless search of cell phone data incident 
to arrest.  While data on a phone can 
potentially reveal to law enforcement that 
additional accomplices are en route to the 
scene, they are not covered by the rationale of 
Chimel and its progeny.  Chimel applies only 
to threats from the arrestee, not third parties.  
In factually specific situations where a unique 
safety threat exists, the exigent circumstances 
exception remains available for law 
enforcement (Riley v. California, p. 2487). 
In regards to the destruction of evidence 
rationale from Chimel, the Court focused on 
the potential for remote wiping or encryption 
of digital data.  The federal government and 
the State of California argued that imminent 
threats to cell phone contents justified a 
warrantless search incident to arrest 
exception.  Specifically, the contents of a 
phone can be completely erased if it remains 
connected to a wireless network and a third 
party sends the appropriate signal.  In 
addition, after a phone locks the information 
stored can be encrypted with a special 
program to completely prevent access without 
the applicable encryption key.  The Supreme 
Court quickly dismissed both ideas as 
justification for an automatic warrantless 
search, noting that little evidence was 
provided that these problems even exist in the 
field.  The Court also reiterated that Chimel 
applies only to direct threats from the 
arrestee, and not to third parties wiping 
content or the normal functions of an 
encryption security feature.  Police officers 
remain free to employ alternative methods to 
protect digital data at the scene of an arrest 
short of a search, such as removing the 
battery, turning the phone off or disabling an 
automatic-lock feature (Riley v. California, 
2014).  
The unanimous Court concluded by 
acknowledging the impact of their decision, 
noting “[w]e cannot deny that our decision 
today will have an impact on the ability of 
law enforcement to combat crime” (Riley v. 
JDFSL V9N3 The Cost of Privacy: Riley V. California's Impact ... 
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California, 2014, p. 2493).  The decision in 
Riley, however, does not completely isolate a 
cell phone from a comprehensive search.  It 
simply requires a warrant or an independent 
exception to the warrant requirement to 
justify the excessive privacy intrusion.   
2.1 Justice Samuel Alito’s 
Concurrence 
While the Supreme Court was unanimous in 
requiring a warrant for cell phone searches 
incident to arrest, Justice Alito issued a 
concurrence to explain his legal reasoning.  
Specifically, the concurrence addressed the 
underlying Chimel rationale cited by the 
Court for conducting a search incident to 
arrest – officer safety and preventing the 
destruction of evidence.  Alito argues that the 
practice of searching a suspect after an arrest 
has a strong historical foundation independent 
of the Chimel factors.   Citing numerous 
historical examples of searches incident to 
arrest as routine practice for police officers, 
Alito concludes that “the rule is not closely 
linked to the need for officer safety and 
evidence preservation” (Riley v. California, 
2014, p. 2496).  In addition, Alito cites 
numerous court decisions that permitted 
officers to read written items found on 
suspects incident to arrest as evidence that 
safety and evidence destruction are not the 
only controlling factors.  The concurrence 
clarifies that Chimel involved searching the 
scene of an arrest, not the search of a person.  
Accordingly, Alito would not “allow that 
reasoning to affect cases like these that 
concern the search of the person of the 
arrestees” (Riley v. California, p. 2496). 
Alito also emphasizes the limits of the 
Riley decision and the need for state and 
federal legislatures to pass laws regarding 
digital evidence.  Citing the passage of the 
Omnibus Crime Control Act after Katz v. 
United States restricted the warrantless 
monitoring of public pay phones, the 
concurrence emphasized the “better position” 
of legislatures to address changing technology.  
As written, Alito concedes that Riley gives 
greater protection to digital evidence than 
physical evidence.  An address on a slip of 
paper is searchable incident to arrest, but an 
address contained in a cell phone’s contacts 
list is not.  Additionally, photographs in a 
wallet can be viewed by police officers, while 
those on a phone are protected.  Alito 
concludes “it would be very unfortunate if 
privacy protection is the 21st century were left 
primarily to the federal courts using the blunt 
instrument of the Fourth Amendment” (Riley 
v. California, 2014, p. 2497).  
3. LIMITATIONS ON THE 
RULING 
A single Supreme Court decision is never the 
“last word” on a specific legal issue.  The 
opinion will inevitably be dissected by the 
lower courts, distinguished by different factual 
circumstances and interpreted differently.  
The Riley decision provides several notable 
limitations that can potentially impact police 
officers’ enforcement of the ruling.  For 
example, the Roberts Court traditionally 
issues very limited decisions that apply 
specifically to the factual situations presented.   
Riley is no exception.  Both consolidated cases 
resolved in Riley involved searches of cell 
phones incident to arrest.  Consequently, the 
Court’s ruling appears to apply only in 
situations where the suspect is arrested.  This 
leaves open the possibility for warrantless cell 
phone searches in other circumstances 
independent of arrest.  For example, police 
may encounter a cell phone while performing 
a warrantless search under the automobile 
exception.  Although the Supreme Court 
distinguished cell phones from other physical 
property, it did not completely eliminate the 
possibility that a brief content search might 
be appropriate in the automobile context due 
to the mobility of vehicles.  In addition, the 
plain view exception could also arise and 
justify a cell phone search.  If a police officer 
is lawfully in an apartment and sees a text 
message implicating criminal activity flash on 
the screen, they could be justified in searching 
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the phone.  As long as the scenario does not 
involve a search incident to arrest, Riley is 
not completely controlling. 
The opinion itself contains a limiting 
instruction to remind the audience that Riley 
is limited solely to search incident to arrest 
cases.  In footnote 1, the Court notes that 
since both parties “agree that these cases 
involve searches incident to arrest, these cases 
do not implicate the question whether the 
collection or inspection of aggregated digital 
information amounts to a search under other 
circumstances” (Riley v. California, 2014, p. 
2489).  Therefore, the collection of digital 
information by law enforcement using other 
means beyond cell phone examination incident 
to arrest remains an open legal issue.   
Riley also fails to provide adequate 
guidance for limiting the scope of search 
warrants on cell phones.  Mobile devices are 
currently searched and examined by 
practitioners with nuanced tools that contain 
forms of automated data extraction and 
parsing. While Riley calls for the acquisition 
of a search warrant, the Supreme Court did 
not specify which techniques could be used on 
mobile device.  This issue has already surfaced 
in the lower courts.  The U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of Illinois recently 
ruled in U.S. v. Schlingloff  (2012) that a 
computer forensic practitioner may not utilize 
automated data filters to locate evidence that 
is extraneous to the basis of the probable 
cause articulated in the search warrant.  In 
Schlingloff, a computer forensic practitioner 
utilized an automated filter within a forensic 
tool to search for files containing child 
pornography, resulting in the location of child 
pornography on the suspect’s computer. The 
warrant was explicitly based on probable 
cause pertaining to an identity theft 
investigation, and although the child 
pornography filter utilized to search the 
computer is commonly set as a default 
methodology within the forensic tool, the 
practitioner did have the ability to conduct an 
examination of the device without using the 
filter. Because the practitioner did not choose 
to deactivate the child pornography filter, the 
District Court ruled that the utilization of the 
filter reached beyond the scope of the search, 
resulting in the suppression of the digital 
evidence. Although methodologies certainly 
differ between mobile device forensics and 
computer forensics, Chief Justice Roberts’ 
opinion in Riley draws clear analogies between 
modern cell phone technology and the 
capabilities that are typically associated with 
computers. Because of this commonality, 
Schlingloff may represent a glimpse into the 
future of legal issues concerning the 
examination of cell phones and the associated 
requirements for warrants and methodologies. 
Although Riley largely neglected to delve 
into the intricacies of the scope of search 
warrants for digital devices, the Court 
acknowledged the complexities associated with 
the data capabilities of mobile devices.  Just 
as Apple mobile devices support data storage 
through the iCloud service, modern cell 
phones consistently use data remotely stored 
on third-party servers.  The Court explicitly 
referenced modern cell phones’ utilization of 
cloud computing, noting that “a cell phone is 
used to access data located elsewhere, at the 
tap of the screen” (Riley v. California, 2014, 
p. 2491).   Although the majority opinion 
appears to recognize a necessity for Fourth 
Amendment protection of data stored through 
cloud-based technology, the Court hesitates to 
clearly delineate the important distinction 
between locally and remotely stored data.  
More importantly, Riley also fails to recognize 
the significance of such a distinction, stating 
that “cell phone users often may not know 
whether particular information is stored on 
the device or in the cloud, and it generally 
makes little difference” (Riley v. California, p. 
2491).  While modern cell phone capabilities 
allow for the storage of data in a multitude of 
locations on the individual device and through 
cloud-based services, Riley fails to establish a 
framework for the legal and forensic 
interpretation of these differences.  The 
Court’s opinion suggests that this distinction 
is irrelevant for the purpose of searching a 
device incident to arrest, and effectively paves 
JDFSL V9N3 The Cost of Privacy: Riley V. California's Impact ... 
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the way for further discussion and debate 
regarding the scope of warrants for the search 
of digital evidence. 
Arguably, the Riley decision can also be 
read as applying only to cell phones as 
opposed to all types of electronic devices.  
While the type of information stored on a cell 
phone is analogous to that found on iPads or 
iPods, the justices did not directly make the 
comparison.  As additional technological 
devices continue to emerge, such as Google 
glasses or the highly anticipated iWatch, 
courts will be forced to determine if they are 
similar enough to cell phones to apply Riley.  
An armband used by athletes to map their 
latest run or bike ride could provide 
indispensable GPS data.  Since these devices 
lack the photographs, contacts, calendars and 
other personal information found on cell 
phones, they are potentially distinguishable 
from the Riley decision based on the level of 
privacy intrusion.  The ultimate 
determination of what types of devices fall 
under Riley’s control will fall on the lower 
courts.   
The Supreme Court also expressly noted 
that the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement is still applicable in appropriate 
factual circumstances to justify a search of 
cell phone data.  Similar to other areas of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
warrant requirement is eliminated in 
situations where the safety of the police or 
public is in immediate danger or evidence is 
imminently being destroyed.  The Riley 
opinion provides two factual examples in 
which a cell phone search may be justified due 
to exigent circumstances.  First, law 
enforcement would be entitled to search the 
contents of a phone if the suspect is 
apparently texting an accomplice to detonate 
an explosive device.  Second, the Court would 
seemingly allow the warrantless search of a 
phone believed to contain the location of a 
kidnapped child (Riley v. California, 2014, p. 
2494). These examples simply highlight the 
potential for countless unique factual 
scenarios that justify cell phone searches 
incident to arrest.  As the lower courts begin 
to interpret and apply Riley, this exception 
possesses the greatest potential for expansion 
and abuse.  At this time, however, the justices 
explicitly held that threats of remote wiping 
and/or data encryption do not constitute 
exigent circumstance. 
4. PRACTICAL IMPACT 
OF RILEY ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
Riley appears to unequivocally require a 
warrant for any cell phone seized during an 
arrest that lacks exigent circumstances. In 
order to ascertain the practical impact of 
Riley on the law enforcement community, a 
few points must be clarified. First, the term 
“search” used in relation to a cell phone can 
actually describe a multitude of approaches 
utilized by law enforcement personnel with 
varying levels of digital forensics knowledge. 
In some jurisdictions, cell phone searches are 
limited to a simple scroll analysis (Ayers, 
Brothers, and Jansen, 2013, p. 16).  A scroll 
analysis of a mobile device involves the 
manual manipulation of a cell phone, through 
which a law enforcement officer will “scroll” 
through a phone while photographing or 
similarly documenting the phone’s screen as it 
displays the relevant information. Scroll 
analyses, although recognized as an accepted 
practice in the digital forensics community, 
represent a cursory and rudimentary form of 
mobile device forensic analysis, requiring 
negligible training or experience on the part of 
the individual examining the device (Ayers, et 
al., p. 18). 
Other jurisdictions utilize more advanced 
digital forensic tools designed specifically for 
the acquisition, extraction, decoding, and 
reporting of data residing within a mobile 
device (Ayers, Brothers, and Jansen, 2013, p. 
17).  These innovative tools require 
specialized training and certification, as well 
as acceptable forensic laboratories for proper 
utilization. The environmental requirement 
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remains a focal point of concern for law 
enforcement personnel.  Digital forensics 
laboratories formerly focused almost 
exclusively on traditional computer analysis.  
These laboratories adapted in response to the 
exponential growth in the prevalence of 
mobile device use and the evolution of the 
technological capabilities of these mobile 
devices. As the prevalence and capabilities of 
cell phones have grown and developed, the 
law enforcement community has reacted by 
training personnel on mobile forensic tools 
and methodologies, as well as utilizing or 
establishing laboratory environments for the 
analysis of the devices (Malone, 2011). 
Due to the differences in jurisdictional 
capabilities and practices, the practical 
implications of Riley on the law enforcement 
community are diverse and versatile. The 
opinion doesn’t simply impose restrictions or 
regulations on a singular “police” presence, but 
on a number of law enforcement personnel 
working in different capacities. For the sake of 
brevity, the law enforcement personnel 
impacted by the Riley decision can be 
categorized into the following four groups: 
first responders, criminal investigators, 
prosecutors and forensic practitioners.  
First responders and criminal investigators 
are the categorical groups of law enforcement 
personnel that will arguably be the most 
heavily impacted by Riley. As seen through 
the facts of both consolidated cases under the 
umbrella of Riley, police officers who are in 
the process of arresting an individual and 
conducting administrative or investigative 
searches of the arrestee’s person or immediate 
surroundings will commonly locate a cell 
phone. The language of the Riley opinion very 
clearly establishes the necessity to procure a 
search warrant after the seizure of a cell 
phone incident to arrest. While Chief Justice 
Roberts identified exigency exceptions in the 
unanimous opinion, his emphasis on the 
acquisition of a search warrant before 
conducting an investigative search of a cell 
phone’s contents has a sizeable impact on the 
actions of first responders and criminal 
investigators immediately after an 
administrative seizure.  
Previously, a police officer may have 
conducted a cursory scroll analysis of the 
phone in order to verify written or verbal 
statements made by the arrested party, to 
expedite traditional investigatory tactics, or 
to document information before a device or its 
contents can be remotely wiped, protected by 
password, or otherwise modified (Murphy, 
2009, p. 2).  Exigency exceptions aside, Riley 
very clearly disallows some of the 
aforementioned tactics that have been utilized 
by first responders and criminal investigators 
in order to expediently search the content of a 
cell phone. Rather than reacting intuitively or 
reflexively as investigators seeking actionable 
information, law enforcement personnel 
conducting searches incident to arrest must 
accept the challenge presented by Riley of 
protecting and preserving digital evidence. 
Additionally, prosecutors will be impacted 
by the Riley opinion.  While many 
prosecutors are currently procuring search 
warrants for digital evidence, they will 
undoubtedly be pressured to achieve a higher 
degree of awareness regarding mobile devices 
that require authority for search or forensic 
examination. The Department of Justice 
currently serves as an example of the reaction 
to Riley on the part of prosecutors, as it has 
publicly announced that it will strive to 
operate within the bounds of the unanimous 
opinion while seeking to clarify and utilize 
exigency exceptions (Myers, 2014).  
Prosecutors will need to provide guidance in 
order to ensure that first responders and 
criminal investigators are dealing with digital 
evidence from cell phones in a manner that is 
consistent with the Riley decision. More 
importantly, Riley represents the Supreme 
Court’s first foray into the realm of mobile 
device forensics.  As the rampant utilization 
of cell phones continues to permeate the lives 
of American citizens, the Court will inevitably 
need to make similarly impactful decisions in 
the future regarding warrant scope 
considerations and plain view technicalities as 
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they relate to the forensic analyses of cell 
phones. As these legal discussions evolve, 
prosecutors will face the unenviable task of 
representing the Government’s interests, 
educating first responders, and learning the 
methodological nuances of mobile device 
forensics from competent practitioners. 
Although the on-site methods utilized by 
first responders to expediently search the 
contents of a cell phone appear to have been 
largely invalidated by Riley, Chief Justice 
Robert’s language seems less indicative of a 
dramatic change in policy for the part of the 
fourth categorical group of law enforcement 
personnel, the certified forensic practitioners. 
The vast majority of mobile device forensic 
practitioners currently require legal authority 
to examine a cell phone through a search 
warrant or written consent due to industry 
standards and individual agency operating 
procedures (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004, 
p. 7).  While the language of Riley does little 
to hamper the current practices of mobile 
device forensic examiners, it may have a 
counterintuitive and decidedly positive impact 
on the discipline of mobile device forensics as 
whole. Rather than placing an emphasis on 
the ambiguously dangerous “cost” that privacy 
in the digital age may have, the Riley decision 
clearly communicates the nuances and 
protocols associated with mobile device 
forensics for the law enforcement community. 
In order to do so, Chief Justice Roberts 
relied on the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) Guidelines on Mobile 
Device Forensics (Riley v. California, 2014, p. 
2486).  Roberts used these guidelines to 
emphasize and respond to the government’s 
arguments about remote data wiping, 
encryption, and similar concerns about the 
volatility of data residing on mobile devices. 
By utilizing industry standards and 
appropriate literature, the Supreme Court 
outlined a blueprint for acceptable law 
enforcement techniques utilized to secure and 
examine a cell phone. 
 
 
5. THE BLUEPRINT: 
ACCEPTABLE TECHNIQUES 
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AFTER RILEY 
First, the physical aspects of a phone may be 
inspected to determine if it could be used as a 
weapon.  Although fairly straightforward and 
simplistic, the Supreme Court’s allowance of a 
physical inspection of a cell phone serves to 
protect the law enforcement official, typically 
a responding officer or investigator, from 
immediate and obvious danger.  Although 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion clearly 
demonstrates the Court’s prioritization of 
personal privacy over the government’s 
concerns about the protection of digital 
evidence, the opinion also relays several 
acceptable practices for law enforcement to 
protect volatile digital evidence on mobile 
devices.  Aside from a physical inspection of 
the device, the second allowable practice 
suggests that police officers concerned with 
the threat of remote wiping can remove a 
phone’s battery or turn the phone off (Riley v. 
California, 2014, p. 2487).  Although the 
removal of a cell phone’s power source will 
ultimately prevent a phone from being 
remotely wiped through a command using 
wireless connectivity or cellular network 
services, the practice can create different 
problems for mobile device practitioners. 
Removing a cell phone’s battery or effectively 
turning the phone off may activate 
authentication codes such as PIN’s, 
passwords, or complex security codes unique 
to the device. While following this practice 
will maintain the integrity of the digital 
evidence, it may also compromise access to 
the device, effectively delaying or invalidating 
the search of the cell phone.  
Additionally, law enforcement personnel 
can leave a seized cell phone turned on and 
place the phone in a Faraday bag to block 
radio waves (Riley v. California, 2014, p. 
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2487).  Faraday bags are capable of blocking 
radio frequency (“RF”) waves from reaching 
the mobile device and denying wireless 
connectivity, preventing the remote wipe or 
encryption of a cell phone’s data. Although 
largely effective, the utilization of Faraday 
bags entails a certain level of risk. Faraday 
containers are not without limitations, as they 
do allow for the minute possibility that a 
contained cell phone could connect to a cell 
tower in the immediate area. Additionally, 
Faraday bags and similar vessels can be 
unsuccessfully sealed by a first responder, 
while cables connecting a contained phone to 
a forensic workstation may act as antennas, 
ultimately allowing access to cellular 
networks. Unfortunately, even the successful 
utilization of a Faraday bag has negative 
ramifications. Once a Faraday container 
isolates a cell phone from radio frequency, the 
device’s battery life will be significantly 
shortened as the cell phone raises its power 
consumption levels in an attempt to connect 
to a network that is being blocked by the 
Faraday bag. Finally, certain mobile device 
manufacturers and cellular service providers 
design and implement protocols that cause 
cell phones to reset or clear data if isolated 
from the network for an extended period of 
time (Ayers, Brothers, and Jansen, 2013, p. 
30). 
The final options presented by the 
Supreme Court allow first responders to 
disable the automatic-lock feature on a phone 
to prevent data encryption and protection 
through passcodes, or to put the device in 
airplane mode to disallow cellular and wireless 
network connectivity (Ayers, Brothers, and 
Jansen, 2013, p. 15).  Although both of these 
methods have the potential to preserve the 
integrity of the digital evidence, they present 
a shared concern for law enforcement 
personnel. Disabling automatic-lock features 
and enabling airplane mode both require the 
direct manipulation of the device, as the first 
responder directly interacts with the cell 
phone. These methods technically necessitate 
a directly intrusive altering of the device’s 
data, resulting in a digital footprint, which 
could prove problematic if the first responder 
is unfamiliar with the cell phone or the 
methodologies being used. The law 
enforcement community can mitigate these 
concerns by providing base levels of training, 
as well as ensuring that first responders who 
are tasked with disabling an automatic-lock 
feature or enabling airplane mode understand 
that they must document the actions taken in 
order to preserve the integrity of the evidence. 
While none of the techniques provided by the 
Supreme Court represent airtight solutions to 
the Government’s concerns regarding data 
vulnerability, they should succeed in 
establishing a crucial foundation for awareness 
throughout the law enforcement community 
regarding the quality and nature of 
evidentiary data within cell phones.  
6. THE SUPREME COURT 
AND TECHNOLOGY 
The Supreme Court in Riley acknowledged 
the prevalence of modern cell phones in 
American society, noting, “the proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude they were 
an important feature of human anatomy” 
(Riley v. California, 2014, p. 2484).  Yet, the 
justices themselves seem to lack this 
familiarity with cell phones and other 
technology.  The average age of the nine 
justices sitting on the Supreme Court today is 
68 years old.  As law and technology continue 
to intertwine, the lack of technical awareness 
of the Supreme Court justices is increasingly 
apparent.  Justice Elena Kagan, the Supreme 
Court’s youngest justice at age 54, even 
identified the issue of age and technology.  In 
regards to cell phones, she stated, “[t]hey're 
computers. They have as much computing 
capacity as laptops did five years ago. And 
everybody under a certain age, let’s say under 
40, has everything on them” (Serwer, 2014).  
The justices do not even use email to 
communicate with one another (Smith, 
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2013).3  They received substantial criticism 
for their comments during the oral arguments 
for American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, 
Inc. (2014), a recent case regarding the 
retransmission for cable television over the 
Internet.  Several justices were unable to 
understand how the technology at issue 
actually worked, with Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor admitting, “this is really hard for 
me” (American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, 
Inc., oral arguments, 2014; Rubin, 2014).  
Justice Stephen Breyer was similarly 
befuddled, proclaiming to counsel during oral 
argument that “what disturbs me on the other 
side is I don’t understand what the decision 
for you and against you when I write it is 
going to do to all kinds of other technologies. 
I’ve read the briefs fairly carefully, and I’m 
still uncertain that I understand it” 
(American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 
oral arguments, 2014; Rubin, 2014).  The 
technological confusion was also apparent in a 
2010 case regarding the use of pagers by 
employees.  In City of Ontario v. Quon, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy displayed his 
misunderstanding of texting.  During oral 
argument, he inquired about what would 
happen if an individual both sends and 
receives a text message at the same time, 
“Does it say: ‘Your call is important to us, 
and we will get back to you’” (City of Ontario 
v. Quon, oral argument, 2010)?  In the same 
case, Chief Justice Roberts had to ask counsel 
to explain the difference between a pager and 
e-mail.4 
The justices not only need to understand 
how technology works, but also how the 
average American utilizes technology in their 
daily lives.  During the oral argument for 
Riley, Chief Justice Roberts was surprised to 
                                                     
3 Justice Elena Kagan announced that the justices 
do not use email as a means of communication 
during a speech at Brown University in August 
2013. 
4 Chief Justice Roberts asked, “Maybe -- maybe 
everybody else knows this, but what is the 
difference between the pager and the e-mail?” 
hear that individuals sometimes carry more 
than one cell phone.  He specifically asked 
defense lawyer Judith Mizner in relation to 
Brima Wurie,  “[w]hy would he have two cell 
phones?”  When Ms. Mizner replied that it 
was a common occurrence, Chief Justice 
Roberts replied,"[w]hat is your authority for 
the statement that many people have multiple 
cell phones on their person" (Riley v. 
California, oral argument, 2014; Hurley, 
2014)?  The exchange during oral argument 
seemed to suggest that Roberts believed only 
a drug dealer involved in illegal activity would 
possess two cell phones.  While the confusion 
did not appear to impact the ultimate 
decision in Riley, it raises concerns about 
future cases with continually advancing 
technology.   
The degree to which Supreme Court 
justices truly need to understand technology 
before they issue a legal ruling is debatable.  
The Court continually confronts factually 
complex issues on a variety of subject.  Patent 
cases, for example, are notoriously intricate 
and can involve any number of scientific or 
engineering disciplines.  A justice does not 
need to be an expert in every field that is 
brought before the Supreme Court.  However, 
they should seek outside assistance when 
addressing an advancing field to avoid the 
appearance of looking foolish and out-of-date.  
Perhaps the greatest threat to the Supreme 
Court in technologically related cases is the 
complete loss of public confidence.  A 
controversial verdict is undoubtedly 
questioned when the leading Court in the 
country doesn’t know the correct name for the 
widely popular Netflix or that HBO is not a 
free television channel (Logiurato, 2014).5  
While their understanding of technology is 
relatively limited, the justices appear to 
appreciate the impact digital devices 
potentially have on a citizen’s expectation of 
privacy. In 2012, the Supreme Court 
                                                     
5 Justice Sotomayor referred to Netflix as 
“Netflick” in the Aereo oral argument.  
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addressed the issue of monitoring a suspect 
through the use of modern global positioning 
systems or GPS.  In United States v. Jones, a 
physical monitor was placed on a suspect’s 
automobile without a valid warrant and his 
position was tracked for four weeks.  The 
majority concluded that a search occurred due 
in part to the physical intrusion on Jones’ 
automobile.  GPS monitoring today, however, 
does not always require the attachment of a 
physical object, but can be accomplished 
remotely through a suspect’s cell phone or 
other electronic device.  In her concurrence, 
Justice Sotomayor recognized the challenges 
advancing technology poses to privacy interest 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.  She 
specifically noted that “[a]wareness that the 
Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms” (U.S. 
v. Jones, 2012, p. 956).  Justice Sotomayor 
also suggests that the new digital age might 
require a reconsideration of the expectation of 
privacy for information voluntarily disclosed.  
Citizens typically disclose large amounts of 
personal information in order to complete 
routine tasks on their electronic devices, such 
as purchasing items online.  In modern times, 
Justice Sotomayor explains that “secrecy” is 
not always a “prerequisite for privacy” (U.S. 
v. Jones, p. 957).   Consequently, the entire 
foundation of the expectation of privacy in 
digital information is potentially up for 
reconsideration in future cases before the 
Supreme Court.   
7. CONCLUSION 
A Supreme Court decision’s full impact 
cannot be measured until the lower courts 
begin to interpret and apply the ruling.  For 
example, a broad reading of Riley v. 
California may result in the imposition of a 
warrant requirement in situations beyond 
searches incident to arrest.  Alternatively, the 
courts may view the exigency exception as a 
broad loophole for law enforcement to review 
preliminary cell phone data that is connected 
to an ongoing crime or the imminent 
destruction of evidence.  Riley, however, is 
not the last word on searching digital 
information on cell phones and other devices.  
The justices left many areas open for 
interpretation and future Supreme Court 
decisions.  Specifically, Riley’s application to 
other electronic devices remains uncertain.  
Similarly, Riley deliberately fails to address 
cell phone searches in the context of other 
warrantless searches such as plain view or the 
automobile exception.   For now, law 
enforcement must work within the confines of 
Riley and obtain warrants in most search 
incident to arrest situations.  The small 
blueprint of acceptable techniques provided 
by the Supreme Court should be carefully 
followed as the legal wrangling continues.  
While seemingly straightforward, the Riley 
decision has provided the platform from which 
contentious debate will undoubtedly rise, as 
the intersection of technology and criminal 
procedure continues to impact the law 
enforcement community. 
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